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INTRODUCTION
Poor minimal scrutiny. It was once the king of constitutional doctrines: the
savior of the New Deal, reasserting the Supreme Court's legitimacy and credibil-
ity after the Court's obduracy tarnished its reputation during the first third of the
twentieth century. And now we have a symposium asking whether the modern
rational basis test is unconstitutional.
But maybe we are looking at it all wrong. The rational basis test is not
unconstitutional (nor is it the panacea we once thought) because the rational
basis test does not exist. In the seven decades since the test's inception, it has
become clear that it-along with the other tiers of scrutiny-consists of empty
buzzwords. They have no fixed meaning, but instead embody a concept. It is
really the concept that is under attack by modern conservative libertarians.
The concept is that judicial activism should be selective. In some circum-
stances, the courts should defer to legislative judgment and presume, almost
irrefutably, the constitutionality of duly enacted statutes. In other circumstances,
the courts should be less deferential and more activist. Selective judicial activ-
ism is in fact the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence across a broad range of
constitutional doctrines. Since the days of the Warren Court, conservatives have
attacked that selectivity by railing against activism. Now the new conservative
libertarians have switched tactics: Instead of urging deference across the board,
they have begun to champion activism across the board.1
* Heiman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Rick Eldridge, Chris
Serkin, Ganesh Sitaraman, and Jay Tidmarsh for helpful comments. © 2016, Suzanna Sherry.
1. For an intriguing discussion of the theoretical prerequisites necessary to allow this about-face, see
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 527 (2015). For a
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In this Essay, I do three things. I begin in Part I by describing the jurispruden-
tial landscape to show that neither strict scrutiny nor minimal scrutiny have any
fixed content, but instead vary depending on whether the Court thinks the
presumption of constitutionality should be relaxed. In Part 11, 1 show that the
real target of modern libertarians' wrath is disagreement with the current state of
the law regarding selective judicial activism: they disagree with the modern
Court's decisions about the circumstances under which heightened scrutiny
should apply. Part III defends the status quo against the libertarian challenge by
marshalling four types of arguments: moral arguments, constitutive arguments,
consequentialist arguments, and arguments resting on the likelihood of illicit
legislative motives.
I. SELECTIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Hornbook law tells us that most challenges to governmental regulation-
regardless of the constitutional source of the challenge-are subject to one of
three tiers of scrutiny: strict, intermediate, or minimal (sometimes labeled
"rational basis").2
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence applies strict scrutiny to laws that
discriminate on the basis of race or national origin or that discriminate with
regard to a fundamental right. Thus, those laws are valid only if they are
necessary to a compelling governmental interest. Laws discriminating on the
basis of gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny: they are constitutional only
if they are substantially related to an important state interest. Most other laws
are consistent with the Equal Protection Clause as long as they are rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Similarly, First Amendment jurisprudence, while not always speaking in the
same terms, can usefully be described as adopting analogous tiers of scrutiny.
Most content-based restrictions of speech are subject to strict scrutiny, restric-
tions on commercial speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny, and most
time-place-and-manner regulations or laws with incidental effects on speech get
some form of minimal scrutiny.
Cases under the dormant Commerce Clause fit the same pattern. Laws that
intentionally or facially discriminate against outsiders or against interstate
commerce are subject to strict scrutiny, while those that are facially neutral are
subject to minimal scrutiny.
This hornbook law of three tiers of scrutiny still operates in a few established
contexts. Discrimination against racial or ethnic minorities still requires a
more cynical explanation, see generally Mark A. Graber, Does it Really Matter? Conservative Courts in
a Conservative Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 675 (2006).
2. For overviews of how strict scrutiny developed, and how it applies across doctrinal areas, see,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267 (2007); Stephen A. Siegel,
The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEG. HiST. 355 (2006);
G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-
Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299 (1996).
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compelling governmental interest, 3 as do infringements of enumerated constitu-
tional rights (such as free speech) 4 or rights already declared to be fundamental
(such as the right to vote),5 and laws that facially discriminate against interstate
commerce. 6 Discrimination on the basis of gender demands an important govern-
mental interest.7 Most other laws are subject only to minimal scrutiny.
But the hornbook law has not fully reflected the actual jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court (or lower courts) in decades.8 Instead, the Court has essentially
adopted a sliding scale, under which the level of governmental justification
needed to sustain a challenged law depends on the strength of the presumption
of constitutionality. This sliding scale takes different forms. Sometimes the
Court pretends that it is straightforwardly applying the tiers of scrutiny, but then
it applies a relaxed form of heightened scrutiny or a rigorous form of minimal
scrutiny. In more recent cases the Court has often abandoned even the pretense
that it is applying tiers of scrutiny.
On one side, the Court sometimes treats more deferentially laws that should
be subject to strict scrutiny. For example, although the Court pays lip service to
the idea that all racially discriminatory laws are subject to strict scrutiny, it
applies a much more deferential standard to laws that claim to benefit minorities
than to laws that harm them. Both affirmative action and the creation of
majority-minority legislative districts have been upheld over strong dissents that
point out the weaknesses in the government's justifications-weaknesses that in
any other context demanding strict scrutiny would doom the law.9 The Court
also used a more deferential standard than the traditional approach seemed to
require when it upheld Sunday-closing laws that reflected a legislative prefer-
ence for Christianity over other religions (especially Judaism).l° Similarly, the
3. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
7. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
8. Other scholars have made the same point. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 71-74 (1982); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of
Proportionality, 124 YALE L. J. 3094, 3126-27 (2015); Fallon, supra note 2; Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 494-518 (2004); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism:
Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 990-97 (2004).
9. On affirmative action, see Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REv. 145, 156-58 (describing the Court's failure to apply strict scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003)). On majority-minority districts, compare Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate majority-minority districts), with Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.
234 (2001) (reversing lower-court invalidation of majority-minority districts).
10. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge). Cf Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting Free Exercise challenge to military prohibition on wearing headgear,
including yarmulkes, under pre-Smith regime that purportedly applied strict scrutiny).
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Court upheld punishment of anti-war protestors who burned their draft cards
even though the law's effect (and probable motivation) was to censor the
protestors' expressive conduct: the law, enacted at the height of anti-Vietnam
protests in which men burned their draft cards, specifically penalized destroying
draft cards, even though men were already required to have their draft cards in
their possession at all times.11
Even more common than the application of a relaxed form of purportedly
strict scrutiny is the application of a heightened form of purportedly minimal
scrutiny. In early cases, the Court said it was applying minimal scrutiny but
nevertheless struck down perfectly rational laws if they discriminated against
vulnerable groups, impinged on important constitutional or democratic values,
or appeared to rest on prejudice, protectionism, or other illegitimate motives.
So, for example, the Court famously invalidated laws-using the rational
basis test-that discriminated against the developmentally disabled, 12 undocu-
mented immigrant children, 13 or homosexuals. 14 All of these laws might be
viewed as both targeting vulnerable groups and motivated by prejudice; the last
two also involved the arguably important (but not "fundamental" under existing
doctrine) constitutional values of maintaining an educated populace or civic
participation. Civic participation probably also played a role in the Court's
invalidation of a state provision that limited membership on a local planning
committee to property owners. 15 The Court also used minimal scrutiny to strike
down state statutes that appeared to be protectionist in nature, such as those
preferring in-state residents to out-of-staters 16 or long-term residents to newer
arrivals. 17
More recently, the Supreme Court seems to have given up identifying the
type of scrutiny to be applied at all. It has invalidated government limitations on
gun ownership18 and bans on same-sex marriage19 without specifying the level
of scrutiny. Gun ownership is at least arguably tied to constitutional values
through the Second Amendment, and gays are both vulnerable and a frequent
target of prejudice.
Similarly, lower courts and state courts have found ways to escape minimal
scrutiny of local land-use or zoning decisions in cases in which local zoning
boards have used their discretion to favor particular groups or individuals, or to
11. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
14. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
15. Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989).
16. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
17. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612
(1982).
18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2010).
19. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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make "sweetheart deals.",20 Courts scrutinize especially carefully individualized
rezoning, sometimes called "spot zoning. '21 As one commentator noted, "courts
have allowed economic substantive due process-an endangered species of
constitutional doctrine-to escape extinction (and in some instances even to
flourish) within the ecosystem that is land development law.",22
Given the application of heightened scrutiny in many situations in which the
traditional tiers-of-scrutiny analysis does not require it, what is left of the
rational basis test? That test applies primarily when the government regulates
market behavior, directly or indirectly.23 The most prominent examples of direct
regulation are the alphabet soup of New Deal laws and agencies as well as
similar more recent protections for the politically or economically vulnerable:
federal statutes like the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the 1965 Civil Rights Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the
Affordable Care Act, as well as their state counterparts, are all easily constitu-
tional under the rational basis test. Indirect regulation of market behavior
includes environmental statutes such as the Endangered Species Act, the Clean
Air Act, and the Clean Water Act, all of which place significant restrictions
mostly on commercial activity.
And there is method in this madness. For the last seventy-five years, constitu-
tional jurisprudence has drawn a sharp distinction between economic rights
(that is, market regulation) and personal rights. That bifurcation is epitomized
by Carolene Products and its famous footnote four, in which the Court an-
nounced that it would henceforth leave economic rights largely to the mercy of
the legislature while reserving authority to more zealously protect personal
rights.2 4 The tiers of scrutiny were the Court's original attempt to implement the
bifurcation. Over time, the Court recognized that neither the three paragraphs of
the Carolene Products footnote nor the rigid application of tiers of scrutiny
satisfactorily captured the distinction between legislative actions that demanded
scrutiny and those that demanded deference.25 So the jurisprudence evolved
away from rigid application of tiers of scrutiny into the more fluid sliding scale
that I have just described.
20. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CALI. L. REv. 837, 851 (1980); see also Carl J. Peckinpaugh, Jr., Burden of Proof in
Land Use Regulation: A Unified Approach and Application to Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 499
(1980). The seminal case is Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, 507 P2d 23 (Or. 1973).
21. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ETAL., LAND USE CONTROLS, 336-44 (4th ed. 2013).
22. Robert Ashbrook, Land Development, the Graham Doctrine, and the Extinction of Economic
Substantive Due Process, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1255, 1257 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(mentioning "the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses .... ).
24. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1983).
25. For a historical account of this development, see G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial
Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REv. 1 (2005). See also David Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1255, 1268-69 (arguing that the Carolene Products footnote at least gives us a way to think
about how the Court should approach its role).
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But, as the next Part of this essay shows, modern conservative libertarians
want the presumption of constitutionality relaxed for all government regulation,
including market regulation. Today's libertarians reject the Carolene Products
bifurcation, instead seeking some form of heightened scrutiny for government
limitations on all economic rights.
II. THE LIBERTARIAN ATTACK ON SELECTIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The modern attacks on the rational basis test are the latest incarnation of
attacks on the post-New Deal bifurcation that go back at least fifty years.26
While earlier generations tended to attack the application of heightened scrutiny
accorded to personal rights, modern critics instead focus on deferential review
of market regulation. They mostly have no quarrel with the Court's personal-
rights jurisprudence of strict scrutiny; it is the deferential scrutiny accorded to
economic rights to which they object. As two scholars have put it, the libertar-
ians are at the forefront of a movement within modern conservative legal
thought "to embrace Lochner... by recommitting to some form of robust
judicial protection for economic rights. 27
Thus, when Richard Epstein suggests that "there are virtually no cases,
except perhaps on some narrow national security questions, where rational basis
sets the right standard of review,"28 he is urging doctrinal change only with
regard to market regulation. He recognizes that "in areas of speech, religion,
and privacy," his views and the Court's overlap in "support[ing] a broad reading
of the basic protection and a narrow reading of the police power" 29-in other
words, that heightened scrutiny already applies to infringements of personal
rights but that he would extend it to infringements of economic rights.
Similarly, Randy Barnett has long called for a "presumption of liberty"
30
specifically in order to protect "rights of private property and contract., 31 He
argues that "a two-tier treatment of constitutional rights violates both the plain
and original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. 32 David Bernstein attempts to
"rehabilitate" Lochner's vigorous scrutiny of economic regulation.33 Jeffrey
26. For a brief description of the older attacks, see Suzanna Sherry, Property is the New Privacy:
The Coming Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1473 (2015).
27. Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 531.
28. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 311 (2014).
29. Id. at 305.
30. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 259-69 (2004).
31. Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty? 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
5, 12 (2012) (arguing that "protections of our natural rights-both personal and economic-remain a
part of the written Constitution of the United States."); see also BARNETT, supra note 30 at 352
(suggesting that congressional regulation of the market is unconstitutional).
32. Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1479, 1496 (2008); see also Randy E.
Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REv 845, 858 (2012) (advocating rejection of the Carolene Products approach).
33. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE
REFORM (2011).
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Jackson wants to strengthen the rational basis test, suggesting that the weak
version used in economic-rights cases like Williamson v. Lee Optical should be
replaced with the stronger version used in personal-rights cases like Cleburne.34
David Mayer labels as "improper judicial activism" the "creation of the [Car-
olene Products] double standard, under which economic liberty and property
rights are devalued., 35 Michael Greve, focusing on federalism rather than
rights, lambastes the New Deal constitution for its "systematic suppression of
political and economic competition among the states" '36 and derides the Car-
olene Products bifurcation as "emblematic of the New Deal Court's policy of
letting unvarnished interest group swinishness pass without judicial scrutiny
[while signaling] the Court's intention of protecting rights (of a certain
description). 37
The thrust of modern conservative libertarian legal scholarship, then, is that
economic rights should be subject to the same heightened scrutiny as personal
rights. Judicial activism should no longer be selective. And the consequence of
accepting these arguments is to invalidate most federal and state laws regulating
the market, consequently dismantling much of the modern regulatory state.38
This scholarship thus now provides theoretical support for the long-held position
of political conservatives "that government generally should not interfere in the
marketplace.,
39
As I have noted elsewhere, although attacks on the Carolene Products
bifurcation are longstanding, defenses are few and far between-and none are
strong enough to withstand the libertarians' recent assaults.40 In the remainder
of this Essay, I sketch out a preliminary defense 4 1 of the existing jurisprudential
distinction between personal rights and economic rights.
III. A PRELIMINARY DEFENSE OF SELECTIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
I begin by identifying what I mean by economic rights. What I mean here are
the kind of rights that modern libertarians are trying to protect: economic rights
in the commercial context, that is, rights related primarily to revenue-producing
34. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive
Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 537-38
(2011).
35. DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 8 (2011).
36. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 178 (2012).
37. Id. at 198.
38. For descriptions of these consequences, see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY
EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); Jeffrey Rosen, Economic Freedoms and
the Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13, 16-17 (2012); Brian Beutler, The Rehabilitationists,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122645/rehabilitationists-libertarian-
movement-undo-new-deal.
39. Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 570.
40. Sherry, supra note 26, at 1468-75.
41. The defense in section III, especially the latter half, is deliberately very lightly footnoted. It is
meant to be only a tentative suggestion of some ideas and directions of inquiry.
2016]
566 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
property or market-based economic activity.42 Epstein succinctly captures that
focus when he describes as unconstitutional any government regulation that
fails "to keep public hands off voluntary transactions in labor, capital, goods, or
services."43 This includes not only regulation directed at market activity, but
also regulation that applies to both commercial and non-commercial activity but
has its most serious negative effects on commercial activity. As noted earlier,
direct or indirect regulation of economic rights is pervasive at both the state and
federal level, including tax and social security policies, labor regulations and the
Affordable Care Act, and much environmental regulation.44
Scholars have identified two main justifications for the application of height-
ened scrutiny to invasions of personal rights: heightened scrutiny is needed to
smoke out illegitimate motives and to protect important rights. Each is less
salient in the economic rights context. Thus, while heightened scrutiny is
justifiable to protect personal rights, it is not justifiable to protect economic
rights.
A. The Process-Based Justification: Smoking Out Illegitimate Motives
Applying strict scrutiny to require a compelling and tightly linked legislative
justification allows the Court to guard against laws with illegitimate, invidious,
or discriminatory purposes, without actually having to inquire into the legisla-
ture's motives. The Court's application of heightened scrutiny-whether explic-
itly or implicitly-often occurs in contexts that trigger suspicions of illegitimate
legislative motives. Applying heightened scrutiny to discrimination against
unpopular groups (Carolene Products' "discrete and insular minorities") in the
Equal Protection context, or censorship of unpopular ideas (content-based
restrictions) in the First Amendment context, fits this model. So does applying
heightened scrutiny to individualized zoning decisions, on the ground that
42. By limiting my discussion to this sort of economic activity, I mean to exclude rights that protect
against confiscatory (as opposed to progressive) taxation, regulations reducing citizens to poverty, or
the taking of individuals' homes or livelihoods. Those are not ordinary commercial regulations.
43. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 42.
44. There is not an absolutely clear line between personal rights and economic rights. Private home
ownership, for example, partakes of aspects of both. It is obviously property, but it is not used
commercially. "The home is affirmatively part of oneself-property for personhood." Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 992 (1982); see also Rose, supra note 20, at
911 (describing the relationship between people and their neighborhood). But see Stephanie M. Stern,
Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1093, 1096 (2009)
("The legal mythology of the home ... has disguised rent seeking with rhetoric and recast economic
protectionism as a humanistic endeavor."). For that reason, it might be a special case, and I reserve
judgment on the appropriate level of scrutiny for incursions on homeowners' rights. Nevertheless, the
distinction between economic rights related to commercial activity and personal rights unrelated to
market activity can serve to place most government regulation on one side or the other of the Carolene
Products dichotomy.
45. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (Equal Protection); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REv. 54, 96 (1997) (First Amendment);
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 414 (1996) (First Amendment); Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial
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"local government cannot be trusted to deal fairly or carefully" with such
particular land-use questions.46
Run-of-the-mill market regulation does not trigger such suspicions. Even if
some market regulation is ill-considered, inefficient, or even counterproductive,
the Court has no reason to doubt the good faith of the enacting legislature. And
if there is no reason to suspect illegitimate legislative motives, there is no
reason to relax the presumption of constitutionality and no reason to apply
heightened scrutiny.
Compared to infringements on personal rights, market regulation is much less
likely to stem from illegitimate motives. The key difference lies in how self-
dealing operates in each context. Members of the legislature (and others who
are "like them") almost always benefit from-or, at the very least, are not
harmed by-laws that restrict personal rights. As John Hart Ely showed us, that
is most obvious when the laws discriminate against discrete and insular minori-
ties.47 But it is also true when legislatures suppress unpopular speech or enact
their personal moral codes into law by prohibiting things like abortion or
assisted suicide. Of course, some such laws may be justified. But the point is
that because there is a likelihood of self-dealing-that is, of illegitimate mo-
tives-courts require a more persuasive demonstration that the law is justified.
Heightened scrutiny serves to smoke out illegitimate motives when the likeli-
hood of such motives is unacceptably high.
When the legislature regulates the market, however, self-dealing is not an
inherent risk in the same way. Legislators themselves do not derive any special
benefit from laws regulating wages or hours, or requiring contributions to social
security or the purchase of health insurance. Indeed, in many cases market
regulation restricts the actions of people who are of the same socio-economic
class as most legislators in an attempt to help those who are not. Because the
legislature is acting against self-interest--or, at the very least, in ways that are
not blatantly in its self-interest-we can, and should, credit their good faith.
Selective activism recognizes that there is a difference between a law that is
badly motivated and a law that is a bad idea. (In other words, we should not
attribute to malevolence what is really due to incompetence.)
The risk of self-dealing in market regulation usually arises only if we suspect
that legislators have been persuaded-perhaps by campaign contributions or
outright corruption-to enact someone else's preferences into law. And given
the outsized influence on the legislature of those with money and economic
power,4 8 market regulation is unlikely to be the result of such electoral pressure:
economic regulations generally favor those with less economic or political
Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89
(1984) (Equal Protection).
46. Rose, supra note 20, at 841.
47. See Ely, supra note 45, at 152-53.
48. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER
IN AMERICA (2012); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE
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power over those with more.4 9 Conservationists do not have the deep pockets of
the energy industry; workers and victims of discrimination have less political
power than the large corporations who employ them.
There are two possible situations in which legislative self-dealing might be
more of a concern: local land regulation and occupational licensing. Both are
better handled in other ways, and neither justifies the abandonment of minimal
scrutiny as the default test for market regulation.
For land regulation, the problem is that zoning drives up the value for current
owners and keeps out people disfavored by current owners. For the egregious
cases that result from "spot-zoning," courts generally use heightened scrutiny.
50
For the more generic cases, the problem is that while legislative zoning might
sometimes result from protectionist motives, it also solves a collective action
problem: no one wants to limit their own options, but they may want to limit
their neighbors' options. Applying strict scrutiny in such cases, and thus leaving
it to the market to decide in most cases, would likely leave everyone worse off
as all neighborhoods deteriorated to the lowest common denominator because
there would be little or no regulation.
As for protectionist occupational licensing, there are various ways to invali-
date such laws within the current jurisprudential framework. One is to declare
protectionism of that sort to be an illegitimate motive, as several circuits have
done. 51 A second is to hold the regulations to be a violation of federal antitrust
law. 52 Finally, as with "spot-zoning," it is possible to make licensing regulations
an exception to the general rule of minimal scrutiny, specifically because of the
risk of illegitimate motives.
In focusing on these two problematic contexts, conservative libertarians are
using a very small tail to wag a very large dog. Just because the rational basis
test might allow a few bad laws to slip through does not mean that it is
AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012); LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008).
49. Ironically, the two specific Supreme Court cases that libertarians focus on most often are cases in
which we might have reason to suspect the motives of the legislature in just this way. The maximum-
hours law invalidated in Lochner may well have resulted from union attempts to "drive small
bakeshops that employed recent immigrants out of the industry," with the support of larger corporate
bakeries who would also benefit if their small competitors disappeared. BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 23,
23-28. The law upheld in Lee Optical similarly resulted in giving optometrists and ophthalmologists
the power to limit competition by opticians. See Barnett, Keynote Remarks, supra note 32, at 854-55
(discussing the lower court's opinion in Lee Optical). The problem is that we cannot, or at least should
not, generalize from these two cases to assume that all legislative regulation of the market is likely
enough to be venal that we ought to impose heightened scrutiny. Further, other doctrines may substitute
for heightened scrutiny in the case of industry attempts to limit competition. See N.C. Bd. of Dental
Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
50. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text; see also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review
of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 717, 722 n.19 (2008)
(collecting cases).
51. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 E3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220
(6th Cir. 2002); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 E3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
52. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101.
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fundamentally flawed, much less unconstitutional. Indeed, one might suspect
that scholars who focus on these two contexts-rather than on the larger effects
of increasing scrutiny of economic regulation-are trying to hide their radical
goals behind a minimalist screen.
In summary, to the extent that the Carolene Products bifurcation is a process-
based device designed to smoke out illegitimate motives, it is justified. Laws
affecting personal rights are more likely to stem from illegitimate motives than
are laws affecting economic rights.
B. The Substantive Justification: Preferred Rights
The process-based defense of Carolene Products does not fully dispose of
libertarian arguments, however. An alternative justification for selective activ-
ism is more substantive. As one scholar has suggested, the modern strict
scrutiny test serves as a way to implement a jurisprudential distinction "between
ordinary rights and liberties, which the government could regulate upon the
showing of any rational justification, and more fundamental or 'preferred'
liberties entitled to more stringent judicial protection., 5 3 When heightened
scrutiny is used to protect constitutional or democratic values, this substantive
justification is more salient. And here the libertarians can (and do) object that
economic rights should not be considered inferior to, or less important than,
personal rights.
The modern conservative libertarians therefore urge us to equate decisions
about whether and how to engage in commercial activity-to enter into employ-
ment contracts, to buy and sell property, to keep income earned on the market
rather than save it for retirement or redistribute it to the less fortunate-with
decisions about such choices as who to marry, whether to have children and
how to raise them, or what to think, believe, or say. Are they right?
I describe here three categories of reasons for believing that the libertarians
are wrong, and that personal rights should be, as they currently are, treated more
favorably than economic rights: moral reasons, constitutional or constitutive
reasons, and consequentialist reasons.
First are reasons based on moral arguments. Start with John Rawls, perhaps
the most influential political philosopher in contemporary America. He suggests
that there is a difference between individual liberty on the one hand and the
distribution of wealth within a society on the other. Protecting the former, he
53. Fallon, supra note 2, at 1285. The distinction between the two justifications is not clean; there is
often overlap. For example, racial discrimination can be described either as likely motivated by
illegitimate prejudice, or as the violation of a fundamental or preferred right to equal treatment. Laws
banning abortion can be described either as likely motivated by traditional prejudices about gender
roles or stereotypes, or as the violation of a fundamental or preferred right to control one's own body or
reproduction. But for purposes of argument, I will concede that some instances of heightened scrutiny
rest on substantive concerns. See id. at 1310 ("[1]t ... seems indisputable that the court's inquiries do
not always focus on governmental purposes.").
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says, has priority over ensuring the fairness of the latter.5 4 He goes further,
suggesting that there are moral limits on wealth inequalities,5 but we need not
accept that further proposition to recognize that legislative infringements on
individual liberty are of greater concern than legislative adjustments to the
distribution of wealth.
More generally, one can argue that while individual liberty is inherent to
personhood or membership in the polity, wealth distribution is contingent on
particular social arrangements. This suggests that infringements on personal
rights serve as both an actual and a symbolic diminution of one's status as a
person or a citizen. Altering social arrangements in a way that affects wealth
distribution, on the other hand, does not undermine any person's claim to equal
treatment or respect, nor does it do harm to any other inherent aspect of
personhood. This is a variant of Kant's distinction between the way we should
value persons and the way we should value things: the former deserves dignity,
the latter only price.5 6
We can also distinguish, as a moral matter, between objective values and
personal (or competitive) interests. Values reflect who we are; interests reflect
what we want. Objective values come from reflection and deliberation about the
meaning of the good life for humans, while personal interests come from mere
personal preference. Personal rights are about preventing political majorities
from imposing their values on individuals who may not share those values.
Economic rights-at least those implicated by market regulation-are about
managing conflicts of interests. The legislature does not have blanket authority
to select values, but it does have the primary role in managing or balancing
conflicting interests.
When the legislature restricts my right to marry or forces me to have
children, it is imposing the majority's values on me. But when it tells me that I
must pay taxes in order to support social security or the military, it is balancing
my interest in keeping my money against an opposing interest perceived by the
majority. When it prohibits me from clear-cutting forests on land I own in order
to protect the spotted owl, it is balancing my interest in making money (by
selling the wood or developing the land) against the majority's interest in
avoiding the extinction of spotted owls. That is exactly the kind of decision that
we assign to the legislature. We can neither demand that it protect your interest
in the survival of spotted owls nor demand that it protect my interest in making
money-whichever it chooses to do is by definition an acceptable choice. Not
so when the legislature chooses between my values and yours: when it decides,
for example, that same-sex marriage is bad, that one religious belief or practice
54. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1971).
55. Id. at 75.
56. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40 (James Ellington trans., 1981).
A similar distinction is also reflected in the difference between liability-rule protection and property-
rule protection, discussed infra at text accompanying note 62.
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is superior to another, or that women should fill certain social roles or be
subservient to men.
All three of these related arguments are made more persuasive by subjecting
them to Rawls' veil of ignorance: They are arguments that are likely to be
accepted by thoughtful people who know neither on which side of the wealth
distribution and contingent social arrangements they might fall, nor what their
values and interests might turn out to be.
A second category of reasons for allowing the legislature greater freedom to
regulate economic rights than to regulate personal rights might be characterized
as constitutional (with a small 'c') or constitutive in the sense that they are part
of our particular history, community, and web of beliefs.
One constitutive argument is based on the difference between public and
private, which runs through American law.5 7 Market activity is public-in the
sense that it is out in the world-in ways that choices about home, family,
belief, and the like are not. Whether I am willing to invite people of a different
race or religion to dinner at my home is a different kind of decision than
whether I am willing to sell my products to them or hire them in my business.
How I raise my children is a different kind of choice than how I structure my
corporation. What I believe about the existence of God (or war or democracy or
anything else) is not the same as how I choose to earn or spend money.
When we act in the world, we must expect to give up some freedom. The
only question, then, is how much. The difference between personal rights and
economic rights-between private rights and public rights-suggests that it is
legitimate to expect people to give up more when they act publicly than when
they act privately. The difference is not always clean, of course. Many private
rights are exercised in public, or are linked to market transactions. Publishing a
newspaper or paying a doctor to perform an abortion can be characterized as
market activity. But there is a core difference between using market activity to
implement private choices, and engaging in market activity for its own sake or
for the financial benefit it brings.
Another constitutive approach begins with the recognition that constitutional
doctrine-including the Carolene Products bifurcation-does not spring fully
formed from the Constitution or even the Court. It comes, as Ted White has
reminded us, "from a set of shared social and political attitudes that shape[] the
conceptions of the role of the judiciary in American constitutionalism., 5 8 There
are many indications that Americans' "shared social and political attitudes"
grant the legislature considerable power over economic rights. Recent historical
scholarship suggests that until the mid-twentieth century, many Americans
believed that the primary purpose of the constitutional and political structure
was to prevent the domination of a "moneyed aristocracy" over the middle
57. The distinction is notoriously slippery, and means different things in different contexts. But the
distinction I discuss in the text accurately marks general boundaries.
58. White, supra note 25, at 83.
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class.59 One goal of both the legislature in enacting laws and the courts in
enforcing the Constitution, therefore, was to prevent the accumulation of too
much money and power in the same hands-in other words, to adjust both
existing wealth distributions and future opportunities to acquire wealth, as
necessary.
Contemporary American politics also suggests comfort with the Carolene
Products bifurcation. It is hard to believe that the average American would
equate being forced to buy health insurance (perhaps the most controversial
market regulation) with being forced to attend church, prohibited from having
children, or being told who she could marry. The invasion of personal rights,
such as those involving race relations or other social issues, can trigger quiet
disobedience, outright defiance, and noisy and sometimes violent confronta-
tions. Economic regulation, not so much. No one marches in the streets to
protest OSHA or even the ACA. Instead, conservative libertarians-who gener-
ally lose in Congress and the state legislatures-have waged a long battle to
stack the judiciary with opponents of market regulation and bring back the
pre-New Deal "Constitution in Exile.",
60
The difference in the way that personal and economic rights are perceived is
analogous to the difference between what Peggy Radin identified as property
imbued with aspects of personhood and property not so imbued. Just as "if
someone returns home to find her sofa has disappeared, that is more disorienting
than to discover that her house has decreased in market value by 5%,,,61 most
people would be more troubled if the legislature adopted China's one-child
policy than if the legislature adopted Sweden's taxation and welfare scheme.
A final constitutive argument-applicable to property rights but not necessar-
ily to other economic rights-is that the Constitution itself treats property rights
as different from other types of rights. Most personal rights are absolutely
protected, in the sense that if the government lacks a sufficient justification it
may not infringe the rights. The Takings Clause, however, allows the govern-
ment to infringe property rights (under specified conditions) as long as it
compensates the rights-holder. In other words, personal rights are protected by
"property rules" while property rights are protected only by the lesser "liability
rules. ' 62
A third category of reasons to privilege personal rights over economic rights
is more consequentialist or utilitarian. Protecting my personal rights rarely
decreases yours or harms you in any way. (There are a few conflicts, but not
59. See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarch Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REv. 669,
692 (2014); Ganesh Sitaraman, America's Post-Crash Constitution, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2014), https://perma.
cc/VU7T-JPN7. See generally GANESH SITARAMAN, THE MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUTION (forthcoming)
(book manuscript on file with the author).
60. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 17, 2005, at 42.
61. Radin, supra note 44, at 1004.
62. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
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many). But protecting my economic rights often harms you. Another way to put
this is that economic rights operate against a background of scarcity but
personal rights do not.63
Take legislation that prescribes minimum wages or maximum hours, for
example. Without government intervention, employers can probably find employ-
ees willing to work more hours for lower pay. But the ripple effects through the
economy mean that labor is disadvantaged compared to capital. As one commen-
tator described it, the problem arises from "the discrepancy between the state's
moral assumptions in favour of a society of free and equal citizens, and the
economic structure of capitalism which produced an unequal ownership of
property (particularly in the ownership of the means of production), and al-
lowed one class to increase its own political and economic strength at the
expense of another.",64 Thus even if the individual employees have entered into
fully consensual contracts (as opposed to contracts that exploit their vulnerabil-
ity, which is also a possibility), other workers are disadvantaged by the lack of
regulation. If the government steps in, it helps some workers but limits the
freedom of other workers and many employers. Someone loses either way. The
same arguments can be made about the Affordable Care Act: it helps some
people, but at the expense of others.
In the context of market regulation, then, the government is adjusting or
redistributing rights or interests that inevitably conflict. No one can get more
rights without someone else getting fewer. It is therefore up to the legislature to
decide on the appropriate allocation of rights.
That conflict is generally not present with regard to most personal rights. My
speech does not diminish your opportunity to speak. My marriage to whomever
I please does not restrict your right to marry whomever you please. What I
believe or how I worship (or not) does not affect your beliefs or your religion.
The only injury you might suffer is purely psychological: it is "mental displea-
sure" from another person's beliefs or conduct.66 At worst, protecting individual
rights might cost some minimal amount of taxpayer money, but it almost never
infringes on anyone else's non-economic rights. In the absence of scarcity or
conflict, there is less justification for governmental regulation.
This scarcity-based distinction between personal and economic rights leads to
another argument in favor of bifurcation. Equality is a core American value, just
63. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
91, 101-04 (1992) (making this distinction between economic rights and expressive rights).
64. H.V. EMY, LIBERALS, RADICALS, AND SOCIAL POLITICS, 1892-1914, at 290 (1973) (describing the
views of Hilaire Belloc).
65. It is not a sufficient response that we should use either the common law or the results produced
by the market as the baseline and that any legislative deviations from that baseline require justification.
As many others have noted, neither the common law nor the market are neutral baselines. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421,451,501-03 (1987).
66. The phrase "mental displeasure" was used by Justice Scalia to describe psychological injury in
the context of standing doctrine; such injury is insufficient to confer standing. Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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as liberty is. The relationship between the two is complicated and often con-
flicted, but we can agree that more equality is, in the abstract, better than less
equality. Infringements on personal rights tend to decrease equality (or increase
inequality), while infringements on economic rights tend to increase equality (or
decrease inequality).67 This does not mean that every government regulation
that increases equality is necessarily good or even constitutional. But it does
suggest that courts might want to scrutinize regulations that decrease equal-
ity more closely than those that increase it. The Affordable Care Act, social
security, and anti-discrimination laws are all examples of government eco-
nomic regulation that increases equality. Laws censoring speech, banning
gay marriage, or restricting reproductive rights, on the other hand, decrease
equality.
A confluence of reasons, then, supports the Carolene Products distinction
between personal rights and property rights.68
CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that selective judicial activism is both practically and
theoretically defensible on many grounds. Any of the individual grounds might
not be enough alone to justify the Carolene Products bifurcation. But together
they present a powerful case in favor of a selective judicial activism that
privileges personal rights over economic rights. Another way to put it is that
every argument strongly supports heightened scrutiny for personal rights, while
heightened scrutiny for economic rights is refuted by some of the arguments
and strongly supported by none.
This is not to say that the line between personal and economic rights is
always clear, or that there is never a reason to closely scrutinize economic
legislation. Nor do I deny that some personal rights create conflicts or cause
harms. There will always be gray areas, and the closer a case is to the line
between personal and economic rights, the more difficult the decision will be. I
have tried to identify some of those cases; there are likely others. Nevertheless,
67. For a somewhat related description of the "liberty-equality connection," see Trevor W. Morrison,
Lamenting Lochner's Loss: Randy Barnett's Case for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REv.
839, 869-70 (2005).
68. Given the space limitations and the preliminary nature of this Essay, I have omitted discussion of
some important questions that will be the subject of later work. One argument against the rational basis
test is that it allows the government to defend badly motivated legislation by reference to legitimate but
pretextual reasons for the legislation. My response is that as long as the legislature could have enacted
the regulation (i.e., as long as it is rationally related to any legitimate goal), we should not care why
they actually enacted it, since the law is constitutionally permissible-at least for laws touching on
economic rights. A second objection to bifurcated judicial scrutiny is that the difference between
economic and personal rights does not justify the gulf between minimal and heightened scrutiny insofar
as the first almost guarantees that the law will be upheld and the second offers a significant possibility
of invalidation. My response is that if one starts from a presumption of constitutionality-and thus of
deference to the legislature-the leap to heightened scrutiny is justified by either the substantially
increased probability of illegitimate motives or the substantially increased importance of the right in
question.
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the basic dichotomy holds, and the conservative libertarian scholars' wholesale
calls to abandon selective judicial activism should be rejected. The rational
basis test-translated as the Court has done into great deference for most
market regulation-is not only constitutional, it is the most plausible implemen-
tation of the values of our constitutional democracy.

